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#### BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION

1 KRISTIN K. MAYES, CHAIRMAN RECEIVED 2 **GARY PIERCE** 2010 MAR 16 P 2: 30 3 SANDRA D. KENNEDY PAUL NEWMAN 4 AZ CORP COMMISSION **BOB STUMP** IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF HUAL ADALWALL BY CO. 5 HUALAPAI VALLEY SOLAR LLC. IN 6 CONFORMANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES §§ 40-7 360.03 AND 40-360.06, FOR A CERTIFICATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPATIBILITY 8 **AUTHORIZING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HVS** PROJECT, A 340 MW PARABOLIC TROUGH CONCENTRATING SOLAR THERMAL GENERATING FACILITY AND AN 10 ASSOCIATED GEN-TIE LINE INTERCONNECTING THE GENERATING 11 FACILITY TO THE EXISTING MEAD-PHOENIX 500kV TRANSMISSION LINE, THE 12 MEAD-LIBERTY 345kV TRANSMISSION LINE OR THE MOENKOPI-EL DORADO 500kV 13 TRANSMISSION LINE.

**CASE NO. 151** 

Docket No. L-00000NN-09-0541-00151

COMMISSION STAFF'S BRIEF ON MS. BENSUSAN'S REQUEST FOR REVIEW

Arizona Corporation Commission

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#### I. INTRODUCTION.

In order to aide the Commission in its consideration of this matter, Staff hereby files a brief concerning the February 26, 2010 Request for Review by Proposed Intervenor Denise Bensusan and the Applicant's March 10, 2010 Response in the above captioned siting case. Case No. 151 presents a conflict of first impression for the Commission concerning the Committee's refusal to grant intervention in the siting hearings to Ms. Bensusan, an affected local resident and well owner, drawing water from the same aquifer as the proposed site for the project.

Ms. Bensusan's and the Applicant's filings reflect two opposing viewpoints on this conflict. Ms. Bensusan's Request for Review ("Request") states she was wrongly denied intervention. As a result, she asks that the Commission either: (1) deny the application, or in the alternative, (2) grant the application with a stay condition, and reopen the case under A.R.S. § 40-252 to allow for further Commission proceedings with an opportunity for intervention. On the other hand, in its March 10, 2010 Response ("Response"), the Applicant asks that the Commission grant the application without

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delay. The Response asserts that: (1) Ms. Bensusan lacks standing as a party to bring the intervention denial before the Commission, and (2) the Commission cannot review the Committee's failure to grant intervention on the basis it was an abuse of discretion.

In Staff's view, the failure to allow Ms. Bensusan to intervene as a party under the circumstances presented in Siting Case No. 151, substantially impairs the record for purposes of the Commission's consideration of the application. Contrary to the Applicant's position, the Commission is not like an appellate court that is limited in its review of the record for error. The Commission conducts its own balancing in the public interest on siting applications. If the Commission determines the record is not sufficient to conduct its public interest balancing, the Commission necessarily must be able to take steps to address the situation.

However, instead of denying the application, Staff recommends an expedient "middle of the road" process to obtain a full record as was discussed by both Ms. Bensusan and the Applicant in their filings. Therefore, Staff recommends that the Commission grant the application by an order with a stay condition, and reopen its decision under A.R.S. § 40-252 with an opportunity for intervenors to be heard as parties. At the conclusion of the A.R.S. § 40-252 proceeding, the Commission could determine whether to deny or grant the application, and modify its original decision accordingly. These matters are discussed more fully below.

#### II. BACKGROUND.

The relevant procedural history can be summarized as follows. Hualapai Valley Solar LLC ("Applicant") filed its application for a Certificate of Environmental Compatibility ("CEC") for a Solar Thermal Generating Facility and Associated Gen-Tie Line ("Project") on November 23, 2009. Hearings were scheduled and held on January 12-13, 2010 before the Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting Committee ("Committee").

Ms. Bensusan timely filed for intervention in the Committee proceedings, stating she was a local resident and had a well that drew from the same aquifer as the Project. On the first day of hearings, a motion was made to allow Ms. Bensusan's intervention. However, the motion died for failure to obtain a second, and Ms. Bensusan was denied intervention by the Committee's failure to

act. The Committee did not provide reasons for the denial. The Committee also denied the intervention of another local resident in the same manner. There were no other intervenors. As a result, the only party to present its case in the record was the Applicant, in spite of the fact that the two proposed intervenors sought party status to address the most important and controversial issue in the case, the Project's water usage.

On the second day of the hearing, the Committee voted to approve the application for the Project. However, an Open Meeting Law violation occurred relating to the restrictions imposed concerning public recording of the Committee's proceedings. A week after the Committee's vote and before a CEC was docketed, the Applicant filed a request under the Open Meeting Law for ratification of the Committee's vote to clear any shadow cast on its CEC by the Open Meeting Law violation. In its ratification request, the Applicant also asked the Committee to reopen the record to permit intervention of the two local area residents who had been denied intervention on the first day of the Committee hearings.

Pursuant to the Applicant's request, the Committee ratified its vote under the Open Meeting Law to approve the application. Although the Applicant requested reconsideration of the intervention of Ms. Bensusan (and the second local area resident) as consistent with Commission practice, the Committee again denied intervention over the objections of Ms. Bensusan's attorney, Mr. Timothy Hogan. At the time of reconsideration, comments were made by various Committee members regarding the Committee's previous failure to act on the intervention requests. However, the Committee as a whole did not determine or state its reasons for denial for the reconsideration of intervention.

Ms. Bensusan's Request directly addresses intervention issues and quotes extensively from the record to demonstrate why Ms. Bensusan should have been granted party status as an intervenor. Ms Bensusan's points are well taken, and statutes and rules cited support Ms. Bensusan intervention in the Committee's proceedings. Although the Applicant filed a response to Ms. Bensusan's request,

Neither of the two individuals seeking intervention was represented by an attorney at the January 12-13 hearings. Mr. Hogan's first appearance on Ms. Bensusan's behalf was at the January 27, 2010 proceedings.

the response fails to demonstrate that: (1) denial of Ms. Bensusan's intervention is supported by the facts of this case, and (2) the Commission has a complete evidentiary record upon which to conduct its review.

# III. THE FAILURE TO PERMIT AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS LIKE MS. BENSUSAN TO INTERVENE IN SITING MATTERS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY SITING SCHEME.

The siting statutory scheme is set up to provide interested and affected entities and individuals an opportunity to meaningfully participate through intervention in siting of projects. The Line Siting statutes were added by Laws 1971, Ch. 67. Laws 1971, Ch. 67, § 1 states:

[T]he legislature finds that existing law does not provide adequate **opportunity for individuals**, groups interested in conservation and the protection of the environment, local governments, and other public bodies to participate in timely fashion in the decision to locate a specific major facility at a specific site. The legislature therefore, declares that it is the purpose of this article to provide a single forum for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning the location of electric generating plants and transmission lines in a single proceeding to which access will be open to interested and affected individuals, groups, county and municipal governments and other public bodies to enable them to participate in these decisions. (emphasis added).

Ms. Bensusan asserted that she was a local resident affected by the Project, including the Project's water usage which would draw down water from the same aquifer as her own well. No other party to the proceeding stood in her position and no other party could represent her interests. Although Committee members commented that allowing Ms. Bensusan to intervene could open the floodgates to 800 other well owners drawing from the same aquifer, those are not the facts of this case. Only two individuals sought intervention in this matter. Moreover, the siting statutory provisions provide a tool to prevent a possible flood of nongovernmental intervenors. If the Committee so chooses, nongovernmental parties with similar interests may be required to consolidate their representation. See A.R.S. § 40-360.04(C).

The failure to grant intervention under these circumstances is not consistent with the siting statutory scheme or with the Commission's practice to open its proceedings to full participation by interested entities and individuals who may be adversely impacted by an application. As stated by

1 Ms. Bensusan, her elimination as a party in the siting hearings defeats the meaning of the process.
2 Hrg. Tr. at 13.

### IV. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING INTERVENTION.

Committee members commented and the Applicant's Response implies that the Committee has unfettered discretion to determine the appropriateness of the intervention of nongovernmental individuals, citing A.R.S. § 40-360.05(A)(4). Their reliance on the statute is misplaced. Neither A.R.S. § 40-360.05(A)(4) nor any Committee rule provides a standard for determining the "appropriateness" of interventions. However, Line Siting Rule R14-3-216 states that Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the absence of a Committee rule.

Civil Procedure Rule 24 sets out conditions under which intervention is granted either by right or by permission. Permissive intervention is granted under discretion of the court. Even assuming for purposes of argument that Ms. Bensusan did not have a Rule 24 right to intervene under the statutory siting scheme, denial of permissive intervention requires a far greater showing in the record than denial by lack of a second on a motion, or after the fact comments by Committee members on reconsideration. Ms. Bensusan was entitled to have the Committee as a whole vote on her intervention, and determine and state the relevant factors upon which the Committee as a whole based its denial. Denial coupled with failure to address the relevant factors in making the decision is an abuse of discretion since lack of information as to reasoning makes it difficult to "indulge the discretion of the . . . court.<sup>2</sup>

Staff believes that the Committee members' focus on the sufficiency of the Applicant's case to create a record for their future deliberations put the issue raised herein backwards. The real issue on intervention is whether Ms. Bensusan's rights to be heard as a party were appropriately protected, considered and ruled upon. *Allen v. Chon-Lopez*, 214 Ariz. 361, 364, 153 P.3d 382, 386 (2007) (It was improper of respondent judge to deny intervention on basis the appellant may not ultimately succeed on the outcome, rather than permitting her the right to litigate that issue as a party).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Allen v. Chon-Lopez, et al., 214 Ariz. 361, 153 P.3d 382 (App. 2007), citing Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 68, 722 P.2d 236 (1986) and William Z. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 192 Ariz. 385, 389, 965 P.2d 1224, 1228 (App.1998); see also Reconsideration Hrg. Tr. at 20:19-20.

There were also expressed concerns that Ms. Bensusan was not an attorney. Representation by an attorney is not a requirement or a standard for determination of the right to intervene either under the siting statutes or Commission practice. Ms. Bensusan agreed to follow all the procedures required by the Committee of a party, even though she was not an attorney. Prehrg. Tr. at 16.

### V. MS. BENSUSAN WAS NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.

Because Ms. Bensusan was denied intervention, she was denied party status in the proceedings before the Committee and the substantive rights attendant to party status. Over her explicit objection, Ms. Bensusan was not allowed to cross examine witnesses, call her own witnesses and to present her case in the record on her issues, including water usage for the Project, the core issue in the proceedings. Hrg. Tr. at 16. However, she was sworn in to testify. In light of the facts of this case, by placing Ms. Bensusan under oath to provide testimony without giving her the right to cross examine witnesses or present her own witnesses, effectively placed Ms. Bensusan in the position of having had the obligations without the benefits of a party.

As a substitute for Ms. Bensusan's loss of party status, Applicant's Response refers to questions the Committee in its discretion, chose to ask various witnesses. These references are held out in the Response as establishing that Ms. Bensusan's issues were accommodated, and that her own cross examination of the witnesses was unnecessary to protect her interests in the record. However, just the opposite is demonstrated by the record. Applicant's direct case came before Ms. Bensusan was placed under oath and testified. Thus, the Committee did not have her testimony for use in its discretionary questions to the Applicant's witnesses. Even assuming for purposes of argument that the Committee's limited questions on the Applicant's rebuttal addressed some points raised in Ms. Bensusan's testimony, the Applicant's Response fails to show how Committee-selected questions were an adequate substitute for Ms. Bensusan's own cross examination of witnesses and the presentation of her own witnesses.<sup>3</sup>

Although it appears from the transcript that Ms. Bensusan provided written questions to the Committee for Committee members to select and ask, it does not appear that the Committee entered Ms. Bensusan's questions as an exhibit in the record.

Another point should be made about Applicant's Response on Ms. Bensusan's alleged lack of standing as a party because she was not permitted to be an intervenor. It is now asserted by Applicant that because Ms. Bensusan was not a party, she is denied the right to seek review of the Committee's proceedings, and file a request for review. Taken to its logical conclusion, if the Committee denies intervention for whatever reason or no reason, an individual would be foreclosed forever from seeking consideration by the Commission. This viewpoint would not only deny rejected intervenors from stating their cases, in effect it would impermissibly limit the Commission from ensuring it had a complete and full record upon which to balance the public interest. Moreover, under Applicant's reasoning, Ms. Bensusan is also precluded from seeking judicial review of the Commission's final decision.

## VI. THE RECORD IS ONE-SIDED AND INCOMPLETE FOR PURPOSES OF COMMISSION CONSIDERATION.

In this instance the evidentiary record is incomplete. Only the Applicant was permitted to present its case for the record. The proposed intervenors were excluded from participating as parties concerning the central conflict on the merits of the application, the Project's water usage. See Hr. Tr. at 174, 397.

The unevenness of the process extended to public comment as well. During public comment, only local officials who supported the Application without reservation were sworn in by the Committee to provide testimony in the evidentiary record. In contrast, those members of the public and a local official who either opposed the Project or expressed reservations were not sworn in by the

There is an equitable exemption to this rule for petitioners challenging the Commission's denial of party status, because "[i]t would be grossly unfair to deny judicial review to a petitioner objecting to an agency's refusal to grant party status on the basis that the petitioner lacks party status." . . . In such cases, the petitioner is "considered a party for the limited purpose of reviewing the agency's basis for denying party status."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Denial of intervention is open to appeal. As stated in *California Trout v. FERC*, 572 F.3d 1003, 1013 at FN 7 (9th Cir. 2009):

Committee. Thus, their public comments in opposition to the proposed water usage for the Project are not testimony in the evidentiary record.

#### VII. RECOMMENDATION.

The siting statutory scheme does not expressly provide for a remand back to the Committee when the Commission determines that the evidentiary record is insufficient for purposes of Commission consideration. However, the Commission may address the insufficient record problem in other ways. One way is to deny the application, which would require a new filing by the Applicant to start the process over again. Another way to correct an insufficient record is for the Commission to approve the application on a conditional basis and stay the decision in order to conduct an A.R.S. § 40-252 proceeding. A.R.S. § 40 -252 allows the Commission to reopen a case (with notice and opportunity to be heard for the parties) and reach a new or altered decision. As result of the A.R.S. § 40-252 proceeding, the Commission could change its conditional approval of the application, and instead approve, deny or modify its original order.

Staff recommends an A.R.S. § 40-252 proceeding to reopen this case as an expedient way to provide the Commission with a full record upon which to conduct its mandatory statutory balancing. The stay condition should include language to reopen the case under A.R.S. § 40-252 and provide for notice and opportunity to be heard by the Applicant and other parties who seek and are granted intervention in the Commission proceedings.

Hward

zona Corporation Commission

1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2010.

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